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BOOK REVIEWS
God and Necessity, by Brian Leftow. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
575 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-926335-6.
WILLIAM L. CRAIG, Talbot School of Theology
Leftow’s God and Necessity is a remarkable achievement, a major con-
tribution to modal metaphysics, striking in its creativity, impressive in 
its argumentation, and mind-numbing in its thoroughness. Reading the 
book is somewhat reminiscent of ploughing one’s way through Aquinas’s 
Summa contra gentiles: not content to prove his point once, Leftow piles 
one argument upon another to establish his contentions five to seven 
times over. This can make the book tedious at times, though thought-
provoking and rewarding in the end.
Unfortunately, the book is somewhat hamstrung by Leftow’s inelegant 
writing style. He is especially attached to Anselmian turns of phrase like 
“If deity is a property, it is the property having which makes God divine” 
(136). Why not say more simply, “If deity is a property, God is divine in 
virtue of having that property”? Or consider the following statement, 
which is the first condition on “x causally prevents state of affairs S1 at t”:
S or that S is not the case are the sort of thing to come about. (333)
The meaning of this sentence is prima facie obscure (and the numeral turns 
out to be a footnote rather than a superscript). Combine such sentences 
with convolutions like
I later explain at some length just how non-God-involving (henceforth secu-
lar) God or these items make such truths true (83) . . .
and
the only reality whatever determines the content of logical truths could have 
had from all eternity, consistent with (FD), was in the mind of God (91) . . . ,
and one is not sure whether one is confronted with a characteristic 
Leftowism or one of the many printer’s errors throughout the book. The 
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combination of the two makes for a turgid mix which requires patience 
and perseverance (and sometimes multiple readings) in order to get 
through. Fortunately, the read is worth the time and effort.
The fundamental aim of the book is to meet the ostensible challenge 
posed by necessary truths to the claim that God is the sole ultimate real-
ity by formulating and defending a theistic metaphysics for grounding 
modal truths. The basic question which the book seeks to answer is how 
modal truths relate to God. The book also takes up the subsidiary chal-
lenge posed by abstract objects to divine ultimacy (27).
The book is commendable theologically for its robust defense of God’s 
status as the sole ultimate reality. Leftow takes seriously the biblical wit-
ness to God’s unique aseity and creation ex nihilo of all things outside 
Himself. Leftow therefore affirms the fundamental thesis that God is the 
Source of All that is outside Him:
(GSA) For all x, if x is not God, a part, aspect, or attribute of God, or an event, 
God makes the creating-ex-nihilo sort of causal contribution to x’s existence 
as long as x exists (20).1
Not only is (GSA) scripturally attested, but the (GSA)-property is argu-
ably also a perfection which perfect being theology accordingly ascribes 
to God (21–22).
Given that some truths are absolutely necessary (true no matter what), 
a conflict with classical theism arises from the assumptions2 that
9. Some strongly necessary truths are not about God and are not negative 
existentials, e.g., mathematical truths.
10. It is always the case that if a truth is necessary and not a negative exis-
tential, it has an ontology.
11. If a necessary truth not about God has an ontology, all of it lies outside 
God.
The conjunction of these assumptions implies that there always exists 
something ontologically outside God which supplies the ontology for 
mathematical truths, for example. But Leftow thinks it difficult to see how 
such abstracta could be created by God, which contradicts (GSA) (26).
In his second chapter Leftow identifies four possible ways to deal with 
this apparent conflict:
(i) Deny that modal truths have an ontology.
(ii) Restrict the scope of (GSA) to exempt various abstracta.
(iii) Adopt a “safe” ontology that does not conflict with (GSA).
(iv) Make God the ontological foundation of modality.
1The inclusion of events in the list of exceptions is a curiosity which Leftow later with-
draws (76 ff.).
2I retain Leftow’s numbering.
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Leftow concedes that his brief discussion of (i)–(iii) does not suffice to dis-
pose of them conclusively, but he thinks that he has given “at least some 
reason to think that these will not do” (71). The bulk of the book is then 
taken up by an examination of the competing theistic views.
Theistic views are united in their conviction, which Leftow thinks the-
ists ought to endorse, that for any true modal proposition P God either 
is, contains, has, has attributes that have, or produces all truth-makers or 
truth-explainers for ◊P or P (115). Theistic theories may be differenti-
ated on the basis of which facet of theism they call upon to explain modal 
truths. An important class of theistic theories, indeed, the dominant posi-
tion, is what Leftow calls deity theories, those which ground modality in 
God’s nature. Thomism is a prime example of such a theory. Not only does 
Leftow find no good reason to embrace a deity theory (chapter 6), but he 
also subjects them to particularly heavy criticism (chapter 8).
Instead, or in addition, to God’s nature, other theistic theories appeal 
to God’s activity to ground modal truths, either His contingent activity 
(Cartesianism), or His necessary activity, as either determined by His na-
ture (Leibnizianism) or not so determined (Leftow’s view) (136). Leftow 
considers Descartes’s platonism uneconomical, since it assumes a realm of 
dependently existing abstracta (74), and incoherent, since it cannot be up 
to anything what its own nature is (134), and he regards Leibniz’s natural 
act theory as a needlessly elaborated deity theory, since God’s nature de-
termines His activity (144).
On Leftow’s view necessary truths of logic and mathematics, like neces-
sary truths solely about God, have their foundation in God’s nature. Where 
he departs from deity theories is his handling of so-called secular modal 
truths, truths which provide no information about God (249).3 Leftow 
develops an ingenious account of how God is responsible for stipulating 
modal truths about creatures.
On a deity theory like Aquinas’s, the divine nature includes powers to 
do various things, such as to create a dog, and therefore it is possible that 
dogs exist. One may move away from such a deity theory in two steps: (1) 
Agree that it belongs to God’s nature to conceive various secular states of 
affairs, but then hold that it is at God’s discretion to assign to them their 
modal status. So God by His nature conceives of things like zebras, mar-
ried bachelors, round squares, and unicorns, and He freely decides which 
of these will be possible or not. (2) Deny that it belongs to God’s nature 
to conceive all the various secular states of affairs and thus restrict God’s 
powers to general abilities to conceive, create, and so on, in the place of de-
terminate powers like the ability to create a dog. It is up to God to invent 
or “dream up” the various secular states of affairs before assigning their 
modal status to them. Thus, Leftow’s view, like Cartesianism, has a strong 
3Leftow holds that logical and mathematical truths do provide information about God, 
since he takes them to be universally quantified statements (251). 
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voluntaristic component: God freely thinks up secular states of affairs and 
then freely decides which of them are to be possible or not.
Leftow’s view leads to a bizarre modal theory. One might think that on 
his view God could have decided to dream up other states of affairs or 
could have assigned to them a modal status different from that which they 
have. But such modal locutions cannot be true until God has determined 
what is and is not possible. Modality on Leftow’s view arises only ex post 
facto, so that, given God’s decision, it is now impossible that God could 
have dreamed up different states of affairs or made round squares pos-
sible.4 There is no possible world in which God thinks up different secular 
states of affairs or assigns a different modal status to them. Nevertheless, 
it is up to God both what secular states of affairs there are and which pos-
sible worlds there are.
Leftow struggles to find a coherent articulation of his view. “If either the 
stock of states of affairs or their modal status is up to God, one needs to say 
something like that God has the power to bring about states of affairs that 
are not in fact possible, without actually saying it and so suggesting that 
they are after all possible” (253). Leftow proposes the locution that it was 
“in God” to think up different states of affairs and assign a different modal 
status to those He has invented (252 ff). This notion is defined as follows:
God has it in Him to do A =df. God is intrinsically such that (God wills to have 
the power to do A) ⊃ (God has the power to do A).
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the material conditional in the defini-
ens is intended to have as its antecedent the entire preceding clause or 
simply the parenthetical clause. Since on Leftow’s theory God does not 
will to have the power to do A by His nature,5 the definiens must have the 
form: God is intrinsically such that: (p ⊃ q).6 In other words, on Leftow’s 
view it belongs to God’s nature to bestow powers on Himself. God does 
not naturally have the power to create a dog, but He has willed to have 
that power. In that explanatorily prior moment, it is in God to create a 
dog, but He does not have the power to create a dog. Similarly, it is in Him 
to conceive different states of affairs, but He does not have the power to 
conceive different states of affairs.
Explanatorily prior to God’s conceiving creatures, there are no modal 
facts about particular creaturely states of affairs at all. Nonetheless, be-
cause God has the general power to create creatures, it follows that God’s 
nature guarantees that possibly creatures exist. Since it is a secular modal 
truth that possibly creatures exist, Leftow concedes that his view is a very 
4“God could not have thought up other than He did. . . . I only add that this modal char-
acter was not imposed by His nature, but instead was consequent on His thinking as He did. 
Whereas Platonists, and so on, will say that God thought as He did because He had to, I say 
that He had to only because He did” (496).
5Leftow says, “It is in God to make dogs, but it is not by His nature in Him to make dogs, 
since it is not part of his nature that there should be such a property as doghood” (253). 
6This becomes clearer on 296.
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thin, partial deity theory (275). God’s nature alone suffices to make it true 
that possibly there is something non-divine. In order for particular non-
divine things to exist, however, God must first think them up and then 
decide which of them shall be possible.
On Leftow’s view God’s assignment of modal status to the things He 
thinks up is guided by His preferences. Apart from preferences concerning 
moral or perhaps aesthetic value, God’s preferences are not determined by 
His nature but are brute. In line with His preferences, God decides that 
some things should be possible and others impossible. The former, Leftow 
(somewhat misleadingly) says, God permits and the others He prevents. 
Leftow provides a nice summary of the explanatory order in the genesis 
of secular modality (362–364):
(i) God exists wholly alone. There are no other concreta. There is nothing 
abstract outside Him. God has the power to create, and so it is possible 
that there be some creature or other, but there are no states of affairs 
involving determinate creatures.
(ii) God thinks up states of affairs involving determinate creatures.
(iii) God notes any good- or bad-making features these states would have, 
were they to obtain.
(iv) If the states would have good- or bad-making features, God takes atti-
tudes toward (has preferences concerning) their obtaining. If they would 
not have such features, God takes no attitude toward their obtaining.
(v) Given His approval, disapproval, or neutrality, God decides whether to 
permit or prevent the various states of affairs.
(vi) God prevents or permits the various secular states of affairs, thereby de-
termining their modal status.
Finally Leftow provides a reductive analysis of broadly logical modality 
in terms of causal modality. Modalities are determined by powers plus the 
opportunity to employ them. So something is broadly logically possible if 
it is causally possible for God to produce; if God lacks the causal power to 
bring it about, then it is impossible (391). It is important to keep in mind, 
of course, that on Leftow’s view God Himself freely decides which causal 
powers He has concerning specific secular states of affairs. They are the 
result of His permissions and preventions.
What shall we say to all this? To begin with, I think it is clear that 
Leftow’s modal theory, while impressive, is highly counterintuitive. For 
intuitively, if it is up to God in that explanatorily prior moment freely to 
invent determinate secular states of affairs and creaturely essences and 
freely to assign to them their modal status, then God was able to do so, 
had the power to do so, and could do so. Not only that, but He also was 
able to invent and decide differently, had the power to do so, and could 
have done so. This is just how these modal locutions are used. But on 
Leftow’s theory all that is false. God lacked the power to conceive of a dog 
and so also the power to make dogs possible. And on Leftow’s strange 
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retrospective modality, it is impossible that God have done anything dif-
ferently. Flouting our strong modal intuitions, Leftow’s theory is therefore 
highly counterintuitive.
Moreover, his theory may well be incoherent. On Leftow’s view it is 
“in God” to think up different secular states of affairs or creaturely es-
sences. This locution sounds like a modal notion, to the effect that God 
was able to do such things. Leftow uses the locution in this way as well, 
as we have seen. But Leftow denies that it is a modal notion (253). Being 
in God is defined to mean that God’s nature is such that a certain mate-
rial conditional is true: if God wills to have a particular power, such as to 
create dogs, then He has it. Leftow’s conditional definition of what it is 
to be “in God” is equivalent to saying that God wills to have a particular 
power only if He has it. That seems to get the explanatory priority wrong, 
which suggests that material implication is too weak to serve the intended 
purpose here. The intention seems to be to make God’s willing to have a 
particular power explanatorily prior to His having it: He has it because 
He willed it; He doesn’t will it because He has it. This, however, raises the 
further question: can He, explanatorily prior to thinking up secular states 
of affairs, will to have the power to create dogs? The answer is no, for in 
that explanatorily prior moment, according to Leftow’s account, there is 
no such thing as doghood. Therefore, God at that moment is unable to 
will to have the power to create dogs. But if He is unable to will to have 
the power to create dogs, how does God manage to acquire that power?
One might answer that it is in God to will to have the power to create 
dogs. But if that is not a modal notion, then the same problem recurs: God 
is unable to will to have the power to will to have the power to create 
dogs, since there is not yet any such thing as doghood. We are evidently 
embarked on an infinite regress which is truly vicious, since at every point 
God is powerless to will what is required. So being “in God” is either a 
modal notion, in which case God does have particular powers after all, per 
typical deity theories, or else it involves a vicious infinite regress, subvert-
ing a successful account of God’s powers.
Moreover, consider God’s assigning modal status to the secular states 
of affairs He conceives. According to Leftow’s account, God’s assignments 
were guided by His preferences, and He could have had different prefer-
ences. Nota bene that having different preferences was not merely in God; 
according to Leftow’s account, God was able, that is, had the power, to 
have different preferences.7 So why is it not possible that God’s prefer-
ences were such, for example, that dogs turned out to be reptiles rather 
than mammals?8 Isn’t it thus possible, contrary to Leftow’s theory, that 
dogs be reptiles?
7“God has the chance and power to adopt other preferences. His doing so is causally 
possible. So there are alternate, causally possible states for reality, in which He has these 
preferences ab initio” (403).
8Leftow endorses divine conventionalism with respect to non-definitional, modal-essen-
tial truths (432). On Leftow’s view it is in God to invent creaturely essences that include the 
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Leftow denies this, maintaining that God, whatever His preferences, 
must have the same permissions and preventions from eternity that He 
does in the actual world (406). Leftow is keenly aware of the difficulty this 
affirmation presents:
This may seem to sit uneasily with His being able to have alternate prefer-
ences, as it implies that no matter what God had preferred, though He might 
have chosen a different actuality—shaping the universe’s ends in different 
ways, creating a different universe, or not creating—He would not have al-
lowed different possibilities. But this is at worst only a tension, not an incon-
sistency, and perhaps the tension is only apparent (407).
This response seems to underestimate the difficulty. Even were it true that 
if God had different preferences, He would choose the same possibilities 
(itself a highly dubious assumption!), nevertheless, God, as a libertarian 
agent, still could choose differently. So there seems to be a genuine incon-
sistency here.9
As for the tension, Leftow tries to reduce it by emphasizing that God’s 
moral nature constrains His preferences and thus His assignment of 
modal status. But we have already seen how general those preferences are 
and that with regard to many states of affairs God is indifferent as to their 
modal status. It seems perfectly consistent with God’s nature that He have 
decided that gold have a different atomic number or that dogs be reptiles. 
Indeed, if we allow God’s preferences to constrain His choices too nar-
rowly, then Leftow’s theory is in danger of collapsing into a deity theory.
At this point we should do well to re-examine the motivation for adopt-
ing so extraordinary a modal theory. Here Leftow’s subsidiary project of 
crafting an anti-platonist metaphysic becomes crucial. He states, “the In-
troduction’s ultimacy concerns . . . are met if (GSA) and (FD) [i.e., God 
properties of dogs and reptiles or the properties of dogs and mammals. Suppose that He 
has done so. He has preferred that the former be impossible and the latter possible. But He 
could have preferred otherwise. Leftow’s view leaves it undecided whether, had He done so, 
creatures exemplifying that essence would be reptilian dogs or would be some other sort of 
creature, “schmogs,” which replace dogs. In either case, the salient point is that God was able 
to create something that is impossible.
9On Leftow’s view all possible histories form a treelike structure beginning at the moment 
at which God thinks up secular states of affairs (403–406). God’s forming His actual prefer-
ences begins one branch. There are other possible histories branching from that moment in 
which God has different preferences. As each possible history continues from its preferential 
starting point, it branches into a tree of causally possible continuations. A path through such 
a tree is a possible world. Leftow holds that to occur on a branch continuing from a branch 
of actual history is to be possibly possible. But now consider histories continuing from dif-
ferent initial preferential starting points. Since it is causally possible for God to have such 
preferences, paths through such branches ought to be regarded as possibly possible and 
therefore, by S5, possible. Leftow rejoins that since God could not have dreamed up differ-
ent secular states of affairs than He has, “God must have all and only the actual candidate 
histories in view” (407). This rejoinder seems incorrect. Take a physically possible universe 
operating according to different natural laws. God could have preferred that such a world 
be impossible, in which case it is not one of the actual candidate histories. Of course, given 
that all branches originate in the moment of God’s thinking up secular states of affairs, they 
are branches off the actual world and so on Leftow’s own view possible, in contradiction to 
his theory.
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alone is beginningless] are true, there is a level of causal explanation at 
which God alone explains other things’ existence, there is no going past 
this level in any explanation of other things’ existence, nothing other than 
God accounts for God’s existence, and everything other than God has/had 
a cause of its existence” (133). So it is not necessary truth as such which 
threatens divine ultimacy. Rather it is platonism that is the bête noire.
It is striking, however, how independent Leftow’s anti-platonist meta-
physic is of his modal theory. Leftow develops a kind of divine psycholo-
gism which replaces abstracta with thoughts in the mind of God. The theist 
who shares Leftow’s ultimacy concerns may adopt such a metaphysic 
without embracing Leftow’s modal theory. Once one has adopted divine 
psychologism, one need not offer any modal theory at all, for the ulti-
macy concerns have been satisfied. Ironically, then, the central project of 
the book is thus seen to be something of a red herring or addendum to the 
really important matter, which is defeating platonism.10
It lies beyond the scope of this review to delve into Leftow’s formu-
lation and defense of divine psychologism.11 But it is worth noting how 
attenuated Leftow’s discussion of anti-platonism is. For Leftow’s psy-
chologism is an anti-platonist realism. He takes little cognizance of anti-
realist views. This omission is not explicitly acknowledged until the final 
paragraph of the book: “theism yields the best realist account of modality. 
The anti-realist options include conventionalism, fictionalism, and projec-
tivism. . . . My full treatment of modal anti-realism must await another 
occasion” (551). Note how incomplete Leftow’s list of anti-realist options 
is. Conventionalism, holding as it does that there is no fact of the matter 
concerning the existence of abstract objects, is really a form of arealism, 
not anti-realism. I am unsure what Leftow means by projectivism, but 
anti-realist options include in addition to fictionalism such views as figur-
alism, neutralism, constructibilism, modal structuralism, pretence theory, 
neo-Meinongianism, and so on.
Leftow refers to conventionalism and fictionalism as versions of the 
“no ontology” view (540). That should prompt us to re-visit Leftow’s brief 
discussion in chapter 2 of the first way to deal with the alleged conflict 
between theism and necessary truth: the no ontology solution (48–59). He 
rejects this solution because necessary truths, even if they have no truth-
makers, involve an ontological commitment to the truths themselves. But 
a deflationary nominalism would avoid such a commitment, taking the 
truth predicate to be merely a device of semantic ascent, a way of talking 
about a proposition P rather than asserting that P.
10Leftow has reminded me that “not only Platonism counts as a bete noire for me. Possibil-
ism is another, whether Meinongian or Lewisian” (personal communication, July 22, 2013). 
But neo-Meinongianism does not raise the ultimacy concerns that motivate Leftow’s project, 
since abstract objects do not exist on this view, making it a sort of nominalism; and Leftow 
himself thinks that “theism can be conjoined with Lewis-style possibilism” (ibid.), so that 
again ultimacy concerns do not arise.
11I take this up in my review of God and Necessity in Philosophy.
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This raises the metaontological question of what sort of criterion of on-
tological commitment Leftow is presupposing throughout the book. Al-
though he does not explicitly address the question, in a number of places 
it seems that he presupposes the customary view that we are committed to 
the existence of the values of variables bound by the first-order existential 
quantifier and to the referents of singular terms in sentences we take to be 
true (e.g., 77, 81, 96, 307, 480–481, 511). But this metaontological thesis is 
eminently challengeable and so cannot be merely assumed.
Against those who would challenge premise (10) in the argument 
above, Leftow argues that truth must have an ontology (24–25). But al-
though he speaks freely of truth-makers throughout the book, his under-
standing of truth-makers is so thin that the notion of truth’s having an 
ontology becomes utterly obscure. At one point Leftow asks whether, if 
there were absolutely nothing, it would be the case that 2  +  2  =  4. If you 
think not, then “you accept that the latter claim has some ontology” 
(25). What is the theist to make of this? If, per impossible, there were no 
God, then, I suppose, we might agree that nothing would be true. But 
truth’s having an ontology in this sense goes no distance toward show-
ing that the singular terms “2  +  2” and “4” have real world referents, 
whether divine thoughts or abstract objects. To characterize anti-realist 
solutions as “no ontology” solutions in so thin a sense is therefore highly 
misleading. They might perhaps better be classed as “safe ontology” so-
lutions—except that Leftow’s discussion of that option then fails to con-
nect with them. In short, as Leftow himself acknowledges, much more 
remains to be said about anti-realist solutions to the problem of God and 
abstract objects.12
12I’m grateful to Brian Leftow for his comments on the drafts of both my reviews.
Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and Victoria S. 
Harrison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 272 pages. $75.00 (hard-
cover).
PAUL DRAPER, Purdue University
The eleven essays in this collection cover six topics: miracles, design, evil, 
Pascal’s wager, religious disagreement, and faith. As expected, given the 
book’s title, all eleven apply probabilistic thinking to their topics. They 
are preceded by a helpful introductory chapter in which the editors, Jake 
Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison, summarize each essay and explain 
with forgivable hyperbole just how central probability theory has been 
to the philosophy of religion in the last thirty-five years or so. The essays 
are technical to varying degrees; some perhaps more than necessary, but 
